On 17th June 2014, Punjab police opened fire on Pakistan Awami Tehreek protestors, killing 14 party workers and injuring nearly 85 others. The party leadership declared the carnage to be an act of ‘terrorism’, calling for the heads of those responsible. As a result of the ensuing backlash from political parties and civil society, Capital City Police Officer (CCPO) Lahore, Ch. Shafiq Gujjar, and Deputy Inspector General (DIG) operations Rana Abdul Jabbar were removed from their posts. FIRs were registered. Widespread calls for police accountability and reform were made. Less than three months later, violent clashes broke out between the police and PTI-PAT protestors as the latter tried to storm the PM House in Islamabad during their ‘Azadi March’. Yet again, this police brutality was widely condemned, and the same cries for justice and accountability echoed.
Pakistan is not unfamiliar with such incidents of police violence. Prior to the chaos at Model town and D-chowk, there had been dozens of protests that had been tear-gassed and baton charged. Newspapers are filled with stories of police torture, fake police encounters and extrajudicial killings. We sat down with Muhammad Ali Nekokara, former SSP Operations, to talk about the deep-rooted causes of this violence and the ways in which it can be countered through reform. Beyond his vast experience in active police service, Mr. Nekokara has also been involved with police reform and offered us insight into the subject of police violence. According to him, this culture of violence within the police is embedded within the larger culture in Pakistani society. Violence has long been used as a tool, may it be in the form of corporal punishment for disciplining students in schools or to extract confessions from alleged criminals in police custody. The government’s policy of ending the moratorium on the death penalty that resulted in over 300 executions in 2015 alone was widely popular. To claim that violence is a problem unique to the police would be fallacious, since a significant section of our society not only tolerates violence, but also often considers it to be productive. Though it would also be unfair to blame society solely, as they have had few reasons to have faith in the due process.
With violence pervading all institutions in Pakistan, effective response from institutions and forums such as media, judiciary and civil society, which can potentially exercise effective external accountability of police, is missing. In fact, they often inadvertently encourage the use of force by putting the police under immense pressure to produce quick results in response to crimes. The police, under-funded and over-worked, turn to torture as a mechanism to obtain confessions and to expedite the recovery of stolen items, which is particularly important since valuables in Pakistan are often uninsured. The message passed down the police hierarchy to front-line officers is that they are merely carrying out their jobs rather than doing injustice. As officers internalize these ideas, torture becomes normalized; it is reduced to an unavoidable occupational hazard.
In a recent directive, the Supreme Court of Pakistan called for overhauling the police and instituting far-reaching reforms. Although legislation already exists for increasing transparency and accountability within the police institution, it is the failure to implement this legislation that has been a recurring problem.In 2002, Pervez Musharraf introduced the Pakistan Police Order, meant to replace the 1861 Police Act, which had been in place since the British era. The new legislation granted greater autonomy to the police from the elected political incumbents and District Magistrates, and devolved the control over the police from the provincial governments to the Zila Nazim at the local government level. It also mandated the creation of Public Safety Commissions at the federal, provincial and district levels, to provide oversight for the police force and to prevent them from engaging in unlawful activities. This legislation received a barrage of criticism from the bureaucracy and the political leadership. Provincial governments did not appreciate being stripped of their control over the police. The police bureaucracy, incognizant of the benefits of having operational independence from the political leadership, failed to capitalize on the opportunity to support democratic police reforms and improve its image. Within a couple of years, the political leadership managed to amend the 2002 Order and it ended up being implemented only half-heartedly. Since the institutions under the PPO 2002 were never established, in practice, the 1861 Police Act remains in effect, leaving the police force as a colonial vestige.
Given this state of affairs, the police force currently faces two problems: the encroachment of external influence into police affairs and a dismal lack of police leadership. The two are intertwined, since the absence of strong leaders makes lower-rank officers more vulnerable to political pressure, when they have no guarantees that their senior officials will protect them against the consequences of not following political orders. At the same time, it is difficult for the senior officers to escape the same political pressure, since the structure of the police force leaves little room for upward mobility near the top of the hierarchy. There are a handful of top positions, such as IGs in provinces and special territories, or heads of IB or FIA. Even after over two decades in service, high-ranking officers are in no position to take risks by resisting their political overlords. Since the senior leadership does not make any organized efforts to fix the rot within their institution, there is also a lack of internal mechanisms for accountability. There are few formal disciplinary measures that are implemented, which leads to rampant nepotism.
According to Mr. Nekokara, one of the key changes that need to be made to the police force is to reduce the unwarranted interference from the polItical executive. There is also a dire need to establish a discipline matrix, whereby impartial checks are kept on the performance of all officers and anyone seen to be violating the rules is disciplined, regardless of rank or connections. When it comes to minimizing the use of violence by the police,it is important to have a two pronged approach: to sensitize and educate police during training regarding basic legal and human rights of the accused and and to establish a mechanism to report and document each incident of use of force, such as through ‘Use of Force’ Reports. While the use of technology, such as cameras in police stations can complement the other measures, it is possible to dodge such equipment. Torture can also be avoided if the police are given adequate forensic training and equipment. The PO 2002 called for the establishment of special investigating units, which were hardly put in place. If this clause is implemented, it can further modernize the police force. Aside from these internal accountability measures, it is also important to have non-police oversight, to end police misconduct. The UK had established the Independent Police Complaints Commission to investigate serious offenses by police officers independently. Lastly, the gender composition of the police force can also have an impact on the degree of violence it uses. Mr. Nekokara believes that having more women in the force improves communication and also keeps the aggressive behavior of officers in check.
It is unlikely that a handful of partisan protests following an incident of police brutality will lead to lasting reformation of the institution as a whole. It is time for the Supreme Court, human rights and civil society organizations such as HRCP and PILDAT and the media to join hands and make a concerted effort to demand that legislation that has existed for over 13 years be implemented at long last.
JPP'S Torture Watch 